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Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin
6.1 Introduction
The American frontier closed around 1890. This assertion in its obvious
meaning-that there was no unsettled land-is not true: much land waited
to be settled in 1890. But after 1890 there was no place where settlers were
beyond easy contact with the rest of society. By 1890 the railroad reached
throughout the country. Mail, newspapers, periodicals, and publications ofall
sorts could travel by post and reach everyone quickly.
These conditions created an opportunity for the successors to the peddlers
who in earlier years had carried or carted their wares to the otherwise isolated.
Previously, relatively large retailers-however small their volumes may have
been in absolute terms-sold only in cities and towns. But in 1890 the coun-
try's population was still two-thirds rural. Now mass retailers could use the
mails to sell goods where people lived (Chandler 1977). They advertised goods
in newspapers and magazines that reached farmers. They even published their
own catalogues as the extent oftheir offerings and the value of direct control
over the presentation grew.
One of the most successful of these retailers was Richard W. Sears, the
founder and for several decades the guiding light ofSears, Roebuck and Com-
pany. This paper follows the career ofthe company after Richard Sears's retire-
ment and death.
Daniel M. G. Raffis associate professorofmanagement at the Wharton School ofthe University
ofPennsylvania, an associate professor ofhistory at the university, and a faculty research fellow
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Peter Temin is the Elisha Gray II Professor of
Economics at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology and a research associate ofthe National
Bureau ofEconomic Research.
The authors thank Naomi Lamoreaux, Walter Loeb, Thomas Misa, Walter Salmon, participants
in the preconference, and seminar attendees at Cal Tech and the Wharton School for helpful com-
ments and discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
219220 Daniel M. G. Raffand PeterTemin
The company's history is well-plowed ground in business history. Why an-
other pass? We regard previous treatments as being in important respects in-
complete: large and interesting questions deriving from the interaction ofeco-
nomics and history seem to us to have been almost completely ignored. The
two most salient settings for analyzing these interactions in the history ofSears
are clusters ofdecisions made by the company in the 1920s and 1980s. It is on
these that this essay focuses.
In both these periods, Sears, Roebuck faced challenges. In the first period
the company acted brilliantly, in the second not nearly so well. On the strength
of the early period's strategic investment decisions, a company that had been
merely large and profitable grew into the nation's single largest retail firm and
a pervasive factor in the economy as well as in the purchase behavior of a
remarkably large number of households. In the second, however, challenges
unanswered nearly destroyed the company. This paper analyzes the elements
behind the success in the twenties and the near disaster in the eighties and
places them in a broader and more systematic context.
We argue that a company succeeds as Sears did when it combines two types
ofadvantages to make itselfineffaceably different from the mass ofactual and
potential competitors. The first ofthese types bears on demand. The company
identifies and offers goods or services for which many customers are willing
to pay a price in excess ofproduction and distribution costs. Indeed, it makes
its offering on terms such that customers tum to it rather than other possible
suppliers of the same or similar product. The second type concerns supply.
The company utilizes assets that have scarcity value the company can itself
appropriate. For the company's supply to have these features, the assets must
be difficult to do without. (Another way ofputting this is to say that it must be
difficult for potential competitors to provide the offering without the assets in
question.) The assets also must be difficult for potential competitors simply to
reproduce. And the company must not be at a disadvantage bargaining with
its suppliers. For the success to be long-lasting, and not just a momentarily
advantageous transaction, the assets (and indeed all these attributes of them)
must be durable.
Achieving each ofthese two types ofadvantages in isolation may be a rela-
tively straightforward matter. The harder task, the one that makes for a sustain-
able competitive advantage that is truly valuable, is to develop them both to-
gether. Effecting the combination, and so frustrating the familiar forces of
competition and free entry, represents developing the competitively valuable
asymmetries possession of which distinguishes successful firms from medi-
ocre ones, firms that earn supranormal profits from those either losing money
or earning merely ordinary returns.
There is more. Because environments change, the task is never complete.
Successful firms adapt in ways that sustain and enhance the value of the two
sets ofcharacteristics we have identified. New activities are undertaken aimed
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the companies' defensible strengths. Less successful firms may blunt the force
of competition in one market. But they do not adapt, and the value of their
asymmetries wastes. Preventing such wastage (at a cost, of course, less than
the value to be gained) is the trick ofenduring success.
This process is ongoing. (It is dangerous to rest on your laurels.) But it does
not move evenly through time. There are opportunities for bold decisions, and
there are times when action must be taken even without clear objectives. Deci-
sions taken at such times are good ifthey move the firm toward growing mar-
kets and if, at the same time, they exploit the distinctive capabilities of the
firm. It is the interaction of these two characteristics that distinguish brilliant
from mundane decisions. And it is a characteristic ofgood business leadership
to recognize and anticipate this interaction because it is often hard to discern
and predict in a rapidly changing world.
Two episodes in the history of Sears, Roebuck and Company illustrate this
argument. In each time frame, Sears moved into a new activity. In each case
the new activities were profitable at least at an ordinary level from the start.
But only in the first case did the new activities also build on the distinctive and
durable strengths of the existing organization. As a result, the innovations of
the 1920s left Sears stronger at the end of the decade than at the beginning.
The innovations of the 1980s did exactly the opposite. Sears's retailing re-
sources were not maintained and supported relative to competitive standards.
Naturally their value depreciated.
How could the managers of Sears have made such a mistake? They under-
stood the point made above that Sears needed to use its existing capital to
provide leverage for its next ventures. But they appear to have been prisoners
ofthe way this capital had been used in the boom following the Second World
War. They could not free themselves from modes ofdoing business that were
tried and true but rapidly becoming outmoded. The case is vivid but the point
is general.
The remainder ofthis paperis organized into four sections. The first sets the
stage by describing the company's initial mission and growth under Richard
Sears and his colleagues, most notably Julius Rosenwald. The two following
sections describe the decision-making process and the decisions in the two
periods ofinterest. A final section concludes.
6.2 The Early Years
Department stores, predominantly creatures of the post-Civil War urban
boom, established the basis on which mail-order houses did business. The de-
partment stores initiated uniform prices, departing from the individual bar-
gained price ofthe bazaar. The uniform price had several advantages over indi-
vidual pnces. It allowed stores to hire a large staff that could be given simple
instructions and evaluated far more easily on the quantity sold than ifthe em-
ployees could influence both price and quantity. The uniform price also222 Daniel M. G. Raffand PeterTemin
allowed stores to offer a money-back guarantee, as there was an easily ascer-
tained price to give back (Hower 1946).
Department stores carried a wide and growing range ofproducts. They bene-
fited from economies of scope in selling goods that specialized stores could
not realize. They did a volume business and often bypassed wholesalers to cut
costs, a move made possible by their large volume in each good. They even
circulated small catalogues to sell by mail the stock they had in stores.
Montgomery Ward began its mail-order business in the 1870s, soon after
the advent ofthe urban department stores. It followed the model ofthe depart-
ment stores in terms of its wide offerings and fixed prices, but it brought the
goods to the consumer-not the other way around. Business was good in the
late-nineteenth-century economic expansion, and Montgomery Ward pros-
pered.
Richard Sears aspired to get into this growing market. He began by selling
watches, a lot ofwhich he had been able to acquire at an unusually good price,
with a money-back guarantee. He did well and expanded. But he was not able
to build on his success and was close to bankruptcy in the depression of the
1890s. His partner, Alvah Roebuck, sold his third ofthe business for $25,000;
but Sears convinced a potential supplier, Aaron Nussbaum, to buy halfthe firm
for $75,000 (Worthy 1984, 25). The difference between the implicit value of
the firm when Roebuck was the salesman and the implicit value when Sears
was suggests some ofthe skills that propelled the company forward in its early
years under Sears's direction.
Sears possessed both manic energy and real writing ability, and he made the
Sears catalogue a potent selling tool. The Sears product line broadened in the
1890s. From watches and jewelry, it expanded to virtually all goods used by
rural farming families, from clothing to buggies, kitchenware to farm equip-
ment, hunting supplies to patent medicines. The Sears catalogue, advertising
all of them, became one of the wonders of the modem world, a monument
to Sears's ability to portray a remarkably wide range of merchandise in an
appealing manner.
The catalogue presented such a cornucopia ofgoods that itcreated what we
might now call a virtual reality in the minds ofSears's rural customers. It seized
their imagination at the same time that it offered countless items that would
make their lives more convenient and productive. No other retailer-fixed or
mail-offered the range and verve ofSears.
Yet considered as a business, Sears's company was a helter-skelter opera-
tion. As the catalogue expanded and farm incomes grew after the depression
of the 1890s, the difficulty of assembling and sending orders threatened to
swamp the company. Goods were shipped only with long delays. Many reached
farmers in damaged condition, and returns under Sears's money-back guaran-
tee were increasing. As tension within the firm rose, labor turnover increased
as well.223 Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century
Sears, Roebuck was saved from this morass by Julius Rosenwald, a busi-
nessman brother-in-law ofNussbaum. Rosenwald had purchased halfofNuss-
baum's interest and came increasingly to run the company. Rosenwald sought
to increase the efficiency of the operation and the quality of the goods at the
same time. That is, he wanted to reduce effective costs without selling poor or
damaged goods. There were'·two ways to go about this: first, buying, distribut-
ing, and generally administering more cheaply; and second, pricing to take less
profit on each item. Buying more cheaplyrequired being an attractive customer
to vendors. As a large and growing national outlet in an age oflocalized retail-
ing, Sears could do this; and it did so ruthlessly. The second, which was also
implemented, built on the same foundations of large outreach-potential as
well as actual-as the first. Because the average cost curve sloped downward,
overall profits were in fact enhanced by the increase in volume. Rosenwald
actively pursued the first way. This is less straightforward but more interesting
for our story, so it merits more detailed discussion.
Sears, Roebuck initially shipped goods directly from the factories in which
they were made. There often were delays in shipping. The factories that re-
ceived the orders from Sears were supposed to report back to Sears what they
had shipped, but the advices were often slow in coming. When a customer
complained to Sears, the factory was sent a new order to ship. In that age of
handwritten ledger books, there was no easy way to check the new order
against the records ofthe outstanding old ones. The result was that orders fre-
quently were sent out over and over again. The cost to Sears ofall this duplica-
tion was large since Sears paid the freight for returns, and the effect on con-
sumer perceptions ofthe company was very bad. One customer in the 1890s is
quoted: "For heaven's sake, quit sending me sewing machines. Every time I
go to the station I find another one there. You have shipped me five already"
(Emmet and Jeuck 1950, 116).
Rosenwald undertook a massive investment for a new mail-order facility in
Chicago, which openedin 1906. It was a large structure-largeeven by today's
standards-with all sorts ofmechanical equipment for moving goods. But the
concept underlying the building was more important than the machinery.
Otto Doering, the operations superintendent, assigned each goods order as
it arrived a time and place. That is, he introduced a system where each order
was assigned a particular shipping room for a particular fifteen-minute period.
Each department supplying an item in the order was notified ofthis time and
place and directed to deliver the item then and there. Items not arriving in time
were shipped separately. The supplying department was billed for the extra
cost.
Why did this system work so well? At a formal level, it worked because it
subdivided the process ofmailing goods into its component parts and provided
the opportunity and the incentives for each part to be done well. The compo-
nent parts were finding the goods, assembling the order, and packaging it.224 Daniel M. G. Raffand PeterTemin
Working backward, packaging the goods was made straightforward because
all the goods to be sent were assembled by the end ofthe fifteen-minute period.
They could be packed well and sent off. 1
Assembly was done well because Doering's system placed the incentives
where the workwas to be done. Theproductdepartments had the responsibility
to supply the ordered goods to the shipping location. By fixing a time and
providing a penalty for late delivery, Doering enlisted the departments in the
effort to get completed orders out quickly. The penalty was tied to the cost of
late delivery; it therefore was "just" rather than arbitrary or punitive. The cost
oflate delivery appeared as a carrotfor on-time delivery instead ofa stickused
for late delivery.
Finding the goods in the component departments was left to the depart-
ments. As in the earlier chaotic system, they were the best placed to organize
their products to be easily found and dispatched. But unlike in the previous
system, the departments did not send goods to consumers: the goods were dis-
patched to Sears's mail-order facility instead. Given the incentives for deliv-
ering goods to the shipping rooms in fifteen-minute segments, the departments
had derivative incentives to organize their goods in an efficient manner.
The discipline was not as strict as in the modern Japanesejust-in-time deliv-
ery system. Given the technology ofthe time, there was no way it could be. So
the Sears plant in Chicago had places for goods from the manufacturers to be
stored, identified by their Sears catalogue identification number. Orders could
be assembled from these holding bins. The supplying departments were re-
sponsible for keeping them filled.
All this was done without computers or telephones. Pneumatic tubes were a
popular mode of communication in department stores, and they were men-
tioned in the 1905 catalogue description ofthe new plant. Since Nussbaum had
first approached Sears in an effort to supply pneumatic tubes to the company,
their use may have been one ofhis contributions to more efficient operations.
Doering undoubtedly used pneumatic tubes to let product departments know
ofdelivery times and places and to get information on the assembled goods to
departments dealing with finance.
The new procedures also solved the information problem that had resulted
in multiple shipments for the same order. The supplying firms no longer com-
municated directly with consumers. All communications went through Sears.
The need for feedback on which orders had been fulfilled between Sears and
its suppliers had vanished, and the problem ofduplicate shipping information
at Sears and its suppliers evaporated.
The difficulty of implementing this new vision, is reflected in the length of
the period required to make it operational. Forms used within the company
show that it was being used widely two years after the new facility was opened.
1. The prevalence ofgoods reaching the consumers damaged under the old system reveals the
need for care in this step.225 Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century
ButLessing Rosenwald, whojoinedthe shipping department in 1912, six years
after the building was opened, reported that the new system was only then
becoming fully effective (Emmet and Jeuck 1950, 134).
While the new facility improved Sears's operations, it should not be thought
that the earlier chaos had put Sears behind other companies of the time. For
the other resources ofSears"were valuable. In the four years preceding the new
plant, Sears's operating expenses averaged 3 percent lower as a percentage of
sales than Macy's (Emmet and Jeuck 1950, 175). Sears's gross margin was
larger than Macy's-a tribute to Sears's ability to exploit the scale ofits busi-
ness by buying low oreven integrating backward to make its own merchandise.
Profits as a percentage of sales were higher than Macy's even before the new
plant was opened.
Nonetheless, the new plant represented a tremendously valuable asset. The
real competition Sears faced at this stage ofits history came from other mail-
order firms. The new plant helped address customer needs. Considered as
a complex asset in itself-facility, systems, people, and know-how all to-
gether-the plant possessed all the subsidiary features supporting scarcity
value. It enabled the company to trade in volumes that freed Sears from up-
stream appropriation threats and supported low prices to customers. And the
company complemented this by monitoring its downstream activities-the
pricing and presentation ofits offerings relative to that ofits competitors-to
make sure it stayed up to the mark where not actually defining it.2
In the early years of the century, then, Sears had a large market, attractive
goods, a well-deserved national reputation for reasonable prices and general
reliability, and distribution assets unusually well suited to getting and keeping
this all before the public. These are complementary with one another, and suc-
cess fed success. The company was in an unambiguously advantageous po-
sition.
6.3 Operations and Choices in the 1920s
Sears faced a double challenge after the FirstWorld War. The postwar reces-
sion had nearly bankrupted the company. Farm income was down after the
war as European farms came backinto production. The agricultural depression
reduced the income that farmers had to spend on mail-order products. The
long-term population trend was off the farm and into cities, and during the
1920s the trend accelerated. The result ofthese long-run and short-run forces
was that Sears's traditional market was anything but buoyant during the 1920s.
Sears also faced new and vigorous competition for this diminished market.
Chain stores had grown rapidly before the war and had become widespread by
2. The Sears household actually subscribed to the Wards catalogue-presumably under Mrs.
Sears's maiden name! Offerings, prices, and even the quality ofthe stock on which the catalogue
was printed were all carefully monitored. See Rosenwald to Sears, 26 February 1902, Julius
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the 1920s. J. C. Penney, F. W. Woolworth, W T. Grant, United Cigar, A&P
stores, and many such others were spreading all over the country. Growing
automobile ownership made these stores increasingly accessible. The rural
customer in particular was no longer dependent on the Post Office to bring
merchandise to her. None ofthese stores by itselfoffered the range ofproducts
that Sears did. Butthe position ofSears in eachmarketwas nevertheless dimin-
ished.
Richard Sears, for all his gifts, was never the steadiest ofinfluences; and by
this point he was out ofthe picture. Rosenwald was a man ofmuch more appro-
priate abilities for managing a complex organization, and, unambiguously in
control, he successfully steered the company through the shoals ofthe postwar
depression. He then had to chart a course for the open water ahead. The re-
quirement for success was to find a more attractive market to replace Sears's
stagnating rural one. To preserve, much less enhance, profitability, the new
market needed to be one that could be exploited from Sears's great operating
and merchandising strengths. Exploiting the accumulated organizational capi-
tal ofthe existing business would, ifthe match were good, provide protection
from competitors already trying to exploit the opportunity or contemplating
entry.
Rosenwald hired a retired World War I general named Robert Wood after
Wood was fired from a senior position at Montgomery Ward in 1924 in a dis-
pute over strategy.3 Wood had been a devotee ofthe Census ofPopulation and
the StatisticalAbstractofthe United States for many years.4 He read and reread
the statistics. He projected the population trends he discerned and saw that the
mail-order firms' market was moving away from it into the territory ofurban
department stores. As he had at Montgomery Ward, Wood championed the
development of urban retail stores as a way to hang on to customers (Wood
1961, 42).5 To the opposing argument that the stores would simply divert the
mail-order business to the stores, Wood responded briskly that it was "[b]etter
to lose that business to one's self than to someone else" (Emmet and Jeuck
1950, 341). Wood was concerned with maximizing the overall profits ofSears;
his opponents, the profits of one part of the company (albeit then the largest
part).
Despitethe force ofthis argument, Wood did not convince much ofthe Sears
management. Perhaps many ofthe skeptics were defending specific vested in-
terests. Perhaps they were simply fearful of change. Wood did convince the
3. For a glimpse at this and at the competitive environment for mail-order firms, see Wood 1924.
4. This habit dated back to his time as a logistics officer in the army helping build the Panama
Canal. Library facilities had been limited.
5. Wood may have meant that ifone part ofthe Sears operation was declining, it would be nice
to have another expanding. He may also have anticipated (correctly) that there were economies of
scope and that store business would help support Sears's fixed costs-its administration, buyers,
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head of the company, however; and that was all he needed. Indeed, Wood's
ideas had persuaded Rosenwald even before Rosenwald decided to hire Wood.
"You need us and we need you" were the words with which Rosenwald began
their relationship (Wood 1961, 43).
The first store was opened in 1925 on the site of the Chicago mail-order
plant. It was followed in that same year by seven more stores. Sears had over
three hundred by 1929, and 40 percent ofits sales that year were made in them.
The first stores were located in mail-order facilities, in part to minimize the
cost of the real estate and maximize the ease of supervision. But soon Wood
had to decide where else to place stores. He set out to differentiate his stores
from the plethora ofothers already existing. His stores would not compete for
central-city locations with department stores: they would instead be located on
the outskirts of cities, where rent and parking were cheap. They would not
emphasize "soft goods" (clothing, food, etc.) like chain stores, though they
would make a point of carrying some. They stocked most prominently "hard
goods"-hardware, furnishings, farm implements, plumbing-Sears's tradi-
tionallines. They were men's stores far more than women's.6
Each ofthese characteristics ofthe new stores was the result of a decision.
Wood, in his perusals ofthe Statistical Abstract, had noted that, in addition to
becoming more urban, people were becoming more mobile. In a talk given
in 1937, much after the fact, Wood explained that the center-city location of
department stores was determined by the means of transportation (Worthy
1984, 83). Railways, first horse-drawn and then electric, converged at the cen-
ter ofcities. Stores in outlying districts could draw only customers who could
walk there. But the advent of the automobile meant that the center city was
losing its advantage. People could drive to stores that were outside the city
center. In fact, they would prefer to drive there because the traffic was less and
the parking easier.
It is no accident that this reasoning sounds like the argument for the shop-
ping centers that grew after World War II and the shopping malls that have
grown since. Wood was the first to recognize this opportunity, and Sears was
well-placed to exploit it.
An alternative strategy can be seen in stores opened by Sears, Roebuck's
main competitor, Montgomery Ward. Faithful to their rural customers, Mont-
gomery Ward opened stores in small rural towns. (The facilities were initially
intended simply to showcase merchandise. They were converted into stores
in the face of customers' desires to take the demonstration items home.) The
distinctive feature ofthis strategy is shown in the comparison ofstore locations
in table 6.1. Sears stores were located in cities almost an order of magnitude
larger than cities where Montgomery Ward opened stores.
Montgomery Ward had been faithful to its rural clientele in its retail loca-
6. For an interesting retrospect, see Wood 1950.228 Daniel M. G. Raffand Peter Temin
Table 6.1 Population of Sears's and Ward's Store Cities, 1925-29 (number
ofcities)
Population Sears Only Sears and Ward Ward Only
Under 25,000 18 20 320
25,000-99,999 52 84 47
100,000-499,999 47 10 6
500,000 and over 11 1 0
Total 128 115 382
Median population 82,682 43,573 11,647
Source: Worthy 1984, 87.
tions. It therefore shared in the agricultural depression ofthe 1920s. Sears had
been faithful to its merchandising tradition-bringing a wide range of goods
to working families. But it also had recognized that the occupations and loca-
tions ofthese families were changing. It operated at a higher level ofabstrac-
tion than its principal competitor. It found a way to exploit the growth of the
urban market with the experience it had accumulated serving the rural one. In
this it was unlike A&P, Woolworth, and so forth, which only exploited a new
market, and Montgomery Ward, which only relied on its experience. It suc-
ceeded because the features of its assets that were valuable in the one setting
were, properly mobilized, valuable in the other as well.
Sears also targeted regions ofthe country. Wood, ever on the hunt for trends
in the statistics, observed that the population ofthe United States was shifting
westward and southward. He therefore located Sears's retail stores dispropor-
tionately in the South, Southwest, and West (Worthy 1984, 90).
The decision to carry a wider range of goods than other retail stores was a
continuation of Sears's policy. The Sears catalogue ofcourse included every-
thing from underclothes to farm machinery. The new stores would do the same.
There would be goods for the home craftsman and remodelerjust as there had
been goods for the farmer. There also would be the opportunity to buy a wide
variety ofproducts in a single store. Sears even would supply parts and service
for the cars that customers used to get to the store.
The new stores initially were designed to look like the warehouses to which
they often were attached. Wood thought the young people setting up house-
holds would like to buy their goods in a no-frills atmosphere, reminiscent of
the farms they had left or the bare houses they were beginning to furnish. Gen-
eral Wood thought ofhis stores as military commissaries, a term he used fre-
quently. But this decision was at best ahead of its time. Only now are ware-
house clubs thought to indicate good values. Customers in the 1920s were not
so fond of the warehouse atmosphere. The times were expansive, and Sears
discovered that merchandise both looked and sold better when it was displayed
well. Unlike the decision where to place the stores, the decision how to design
the stores had to be reversed. Fortunately for Sears, refixturing stores is rel-229 Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century
atively inexpensive. And business bounced back: people did trust the Sears
name.
There were many reversals of policy like this: the redirection of company
efforts was not accomplished without false starts and great effort. The postwar
inside history ofthe company argues that there was no clear conception ofhow
retail operations fit into Sears's overall strategy. Its summary sentence reads,
"It appears in retrospect that almost the only thing that Sears, Roebuck knew
about retailing in the first years after 1925 was that it had entered the field"
(Emmet and Jeuck 1950, 341-47). But this is an overstatement. It is true that
retailing from a store was a new activity for Sears, Roebuck. The staffat Sears
was used to the procedures ofa mail-order business. The company's mail-order
policies and procedures were by the 1920s well developed and smoothly op-
erating. Retail stores were different, however, and the company had to learn
how to manage them. There naturally were confusion and false starts along the
way. But the learning process should not be confused with lack ofinsight into
the overall logic. It is apparent that Wood had a clear vision for his company.
The problems were all in its implementation.
And the difficulties should not be overdrawn. Sears, Roebuck had been
profitable even before the 1906 Chicago mail-order plant was opened. The
retail stores were profitable from the start as well. Improvements were made
that enhanced the prosperity ofthe stores, but there was never a time when the
problems ofretailing threatened to overturn the decision to sell from stores.
As before, the profitability came partly from the company's low costs. The
stores were located in outlying sections ofcities not only to attract motorized
customers. They also took advantage of lower rents outside the city center.
Despite later claims that the locations were chosen solely for the customers,
the low rents may have been at least part ofthe initial motivation for outlying
locations.
Store rents were only a small part ofSears, Roebuck's expenses. Sears kept
costs low and its competitive position strong relative to a whole class ofpoten-
tial competitors by buying cheaply (Raff 1991). The traditional way to accom-
plish this was to use the large size ofSears as a bargaining tool and force the
price of goods down. Sears buyers traditionally had no loyalty to supplying
companies. They would switch in an instant if a newcomer offered a lower
price.
Wood had a different philosophy. He wanted continuity in his suppliers.
While he wanted low prices as much as any ofhis predecessors, he wanted to
use stable relations with the producers ofhis merchandise to ensure high qual-
ity. He replaced the adversary relationship that had characterized Sears before
the FirstWorld War with a cooperative one. "The tremendous volume in which
Sears bought was not to be used as a club to beat down the source's prices but
as a foundation on which the source as well as Sears could build a prosperous
business" (Worthy 1984, 68). The need to beat down source prices was not
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those for competitors, even those in the new urban setting. The scale-economy
advantages were often large. Even sharing some ofthese advantages with the
vendors, Sears product costs were unusually low.
Sears even integrated backward to a limited extent, extending its operations
further into the manufacturing stage than it had before. The story is told that
Wood, reading a newspaper this time, saw that steam locomotives were no
longer being made in the United States. He called an acquaintance who was
the head ofa firm making locomotive parts and asked him what he was going
to do. The hapless friend responded that he was at his wits' end. Wood sug-
gested that the manufacturing firm could make refrigerators for Sears. Sears
would finance the new machinery needed to change products and guarantee
the firm a secure market. The deal was consummated, and the manufacturer
grew to be a principal in what is now Whirlpool, Inc. (Worthy 1984, 71).7
The attractiveness ofthis locomotive parts firm did not lie in its machinery.
The machinery was all junked in favor ofnew tools for making new products.
Instead the assets ofthe manufacturing firm lay in its human capital, both the
manual skill of its workers and the management skill that held the company
together. These human assets were fungible, an attractive feature to Wood, and
they were employed by him in a process that resembles the European recovery
after World War II and the Japanese response to changing relative prices in
the 1970s.8
Sears participated actively in the design ofmany ofthe products it sold. The
buyers worked with the manufacturer to create a product that the buyer could
sell and that would fit in with other products the buyer was handling. Sears
created a testing laboratory to help this process by evaluating new products
and providing a mechanism to introduce new ideas and further modifications.
Sears also designed its orders to keep manufacturing costs as low as pos-
sible. Goods were ordered in large quantities to capture economies of scale.
And Sears kept its orders steady over time in order to smooth the impact of
demand fluctuations on its suppliers. Sears absorbed the inventory costs, of
course, but it calculated that they would be less than the start-up and waiting
costs involved in irregular orders. The cooperative relationship between Sears
and its suppliers that itself verged on vertical integration allowed Sears to ef-
fect this kind ofoptimization (Worthy 1984, 73).
Finally, Sears took on much ofthe distribution function ofgetting products
from manufacturers to the merchant. Sears by the 1920s had ten regional mail-
order plants. The Sears buyer took an active part in the transport of goods to
these centers. The manufacturer was relieved of the need to plan, and Sears
could reap the advantages ofcentralized distribution.
7. On Sears and refrigerators more broadly, see Tedlow 1990, 305-28.
8. Changes were made in response to new conditions in those places and times within existing
business organizations. It was easier in those settings to use the existing hierarchies to redirect
labor than it was to create new organizations to pursue new objectives. (See Toniolo 1995; Dore
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Sears was not, however, fully vertically integrated. It took only minority
positions in its supplier companies. Wood wanted to influence the manufactur-
ers, but he wanted them to be working for themselves. Sears also tried not to
buy the entire output of a manufacturer, so that the manufacturer would have
to keep up with the general market. Sears kept clear that its primary role was
selling, not manufacturing.
Retailing was challenging, particularly in a time of transition in which the
time-hallowed stereotypes of the lives and wants of the potential customer
base became more problematic. The inherited organizational structure actually
magnified this problem. Mail-order operations were national and high volume.
Demand variations in anyone region-whether for reasons of style or local
income-wouldbe small relative to the whole. The law oflarge numbers stabi-
lized demand at the company level. Retail stores by contrast were far smaller
and by their nature local. Fashion tastes and income could vary greatly across
the nation, with potentially massive impact on the profitability of individual
stores. Buyers had to be far more nimble to stock stores than mail orders.
Indeed, the buyers in Chicago did not stock the stores themselves. Store
managers, and a territorial organization that grew up over them, purchased
from the buyers the goods that were sold in the local stores. General Wood
came to believe that selling from stores on the Sears scale was "too vast and
complicated" for centralized control. He made the organization, in a much-
repeated phrase, into a federation of independent merchants, each local store
manager to a considerable extent autonomous within the four walls ofhis own
store. The buyers therefore had to do far more than simply procure goods on
favorable terms. They had to persuade the store managers to stock them.
The store managers were the appropriate people to make these decisions
under the circumstances. They oversaw the sales, often in the most literal fash-
ion; they lived in the communities; and their jobs involved understanding on
the one hand the desires and needs of the local customers and on the other
the local competitive situation. They were, so to speak, close to the consumer
purchase decision; and the information they gleanedfrom this perspective, oth-
erwise difficult to capture with the technologies ofthe day, undoubtedly helped
in merchandising, pricing, and ultimately, revenues (Raff 1991). Unlike the
managers and the individuals called buyers in the local department stores,
these Sears employees did not have a free hand as to which vendors they used.
But equally unlike their counterparts, they benefited on the cost side from the
advantages Sears scale and reliability offered to suppliers. These advantages
were all complementary, of course; and all helped sustain the advantageous
position from which Sears started.
Within the Sears procurement operation, conflicts developed between the
older buyers used to the strictly mail-order ways and the younger ones who
recognized the new complexities ofthe job. Wood and the Sears management
flirted with the idea ofdeveloping two different sets ofbuyers, that is, ofessen-
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downstream parts of business certainly encouraged a split. But the decision
was made to keep a unitary buying organization and preserve the advantages
of large scale and clear lines of authority. It took many years to work out the
problems of unifying procedures for both branches of the business (Emmet
and Jeuck 1950, 355-57), and, as we shall see, the problems of coordinating
buying and sales never entirely went away.
The automobile provides a dramatic example ofhow actually observing the
customer can help exploit and extend competitive strengths. Farm machinery
was not ofcourse a big seller in the new stores, many ofthem being in subur-
ban sites. But the customers owned, and cared for, the cars they parked. Thus
automotive equipment replaced farm equipment in the merchandise selection
as Sears became a major auto parts seller. The buyers figured out that tires
wore out quickly, and Sears brought automobile tires within the four walls of
the Sears stores. Tires, indeed, for many years provided the highest sales dol-
lars per square foot of any product category in Sears. Sears became a major
channel.
It was only a small managerial step from there into automobile insurance.
The idea ofAllstate was to take advantage ofthe one-stop buying experience
ofthe stores. Ifcustomers trusted and were buying parts, even those on which
safety depended so directly as tires, why not try to sell them insurance while
they were in the store as well? As Wood recalled,
I called a meeting ofmy outside directors in 1931. Business wasn't good at
that time ... and I proposed we found this insurance company. . . . [T]hey
asked me two very pertinent questions. They said: "In the first place, why
should we start anything now, when times are bad? In the second place, what
the hell do you know about insurance?" Which was also true.
"Well," I said, "I don't know much about insurance, but I do know this-
that Sears has the largest tire and battery and auto accessory business in the
country, and every car owner goes to Sears or knows Sears. In the second
place, we've got this system ofstores and instead ofthe agent pounding the
pavement for a prospect, they'll come to our agent in the stores, and our
cost ofacquisition will be far less than with ordinary insurance companies."
(Wood 1961, 74-75)
The shift into selling a service was made almost without strain. Healthy profits
flowed freely almost from the first.
The 1920s represented a critical time for Sears. Its traditional market was
eroding, and action was needed to revive the company. General Wood seized
the new opportunities created by urbanization and the automobile and gave his
company a new lease on life. There were ofcourse problems and difficulties
in shifting direction, but two qualities ofthe innovations made them ultimately
beneficial. First, they were responsive to the market. As every history ofSears
notes, the new stores and focus on the automobile were prescient innovations.
Second, the innovations were conservative in terms of Sears's operations and
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evolved relatively smoothly into servicing the new operations. These assets
were valuable in the new setting, too. Problems were noted prominently at the
time and in company histories, but the change was effected without reducing
company profitability or threatening the integrity ofthe organization. Sympa-
thy with the market coupled to a keen sense ofwhat Sears could do unusually
well was the hallmark ofWuod's innovations.
There was nothing inevitable about the decision to open retail stores and the
associated decisions about where to site them and what products to carry. Wood
is noted so prominently in histories of Sears because he seems to have made
the decision largely on his own. He had no support among Sears's senior man-
agement. As we have discussed, he had active opposition among the rank and
file. His ex ante arguments convinced only one person: Julius Rosenwald. But
that was the only person who had to be convinced to initiate Sears, Roebuck's
transformation. The ex post success ofWood's innovations made everyone into
a believer and Wood himself into a cult hero. Wood became Sears's CEO in
1928 when the previous president died. He was chosen over Doering, the able
organizer of the mail-order facility in Chicago. He was elevated because he
was thought by Rosenwald to have the vision to carry Sears in the interwar
years and because, being younger, he would have more years in which to do
this.
General Wood turned out to be very long-lived. He did not retire early, and
he did not depart when he retired. Nor did the sense of his presence fade.
His apotheosis proved, as the years passed and times decisively changed, quite
unfortunate for the company. It was the reasons for his success in the 1920s,
and not the details of how it came about, that ought to have been honored.
Wood's logic was his valuable legacy. The specific content ofhis vision wore
much less well with time.
6.4 Operations and Choices in the Late 1970s and 1980s
Sears, Roebuck faced a crisis in the late 1970s that was similar to its prob-
lems in the early 1920s. It found its customers' business slipping away. It
needed to do something new to replace the old. But unhappily the leadership
of Sears at this time was not as insightful as General Wood. His inheritors
suffered from a profound misperception ofwhat their fundamental assets were
and what made these assets valuable.
Over the half century following the events described above, Sears had pur-
sued both catalogue operations and retail sales. It also pursued the Allstate
initiative, which not only sold insurance but branched out into a number of
financial products and even came to operate a large savings and loan in Califor-
nia. Overall, this was a very successful period in terms ofthe company's finan-
cial results. And Sears became a dominant presence in general merchandise
retailing: there were years in which the firm's annual revenue approached 1
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in the middle halfofthe twentieth centuryjustas it had had with ruralAmerica
at the end ofthe nineteenth.
By the late 1970s, however, the franchise's customers were changing. Dein-
dustrialization and demography were at the root ofthe changes. Employment
in manufacturing grew slowly in the 1970s and reached a peak in 1980. Em-
ployment in services meanwhile was booming. More important still, the popu-
lation under five years ofage peakedin 1960 and fell for the next twenty years.
The young blue-collar families Sears was accustomed to fitting out were a
fading force in the marketplace. There were fewer and fewer new households
eager simply to equip their houses with Sears furnishings and appliances and
to clothe their young children in utilitarian Sears pants and dresses. In retro-
spect, it seems clear that by the late 1970s Sears's earnings growth had essen-
tially flattened out. There hadbeen decades ofboom since the move into retail-
ing, but now they seemed to be over. The company's earnings from retailing
were even unambiguously lagging behind those ofits principal competitors.
As in the 1920s, other firms already existed to serve newer markets. Dis-
count department stores, focused specialty stores, and other chain stores were
growing rapidly. Even local department stores were doing relatively well. The
company's own research indicated that the customer base was still intact and
that the Sears name was just as trusted as before. The customers even came in
just as often. But now they also shopped elsewhere; and far more frequently
than previously, they stayed to purchase elsewhere too. The issue was only
partly price. Sears was losing some sales to discounters, but it was also losing
sales to these other competitors (Brennan 1980, unnumbered p. 5). The notion
that the nation had excess capacity in retail space-that it had become
"overstored"-became as much discussed within the company as in the trade
press.
This overstoring was ironic. It seems very likely that many ofthe specialty
store, chain, and outlet stores in question were locatednear or even in suburban
and regional shopping malls anchored by the Sears stores in question. The
casual accessibility ofother stores within a mall or in adjacent ones made price
comparisons more convenient. Any contrast between Sears's offerings and
those of the other retailers-or even a contrast between the attractiveness of
the two presentations-couldbe easily noticed and acted upon. The proximity
made things much harder for Sears. Wood's move to sites with cheap land and
plentiful parking was far less attractive when other retailers made the move
right along with Sears.
Less attractive as it mightbe, cash flow was still strong. Borrowing capacity
remained ample. So Sears could lay its hands on money to change how it did
business. As the sense ofcrisis in retailing operations grew, the question arose
of what to do. As in the 1920s, Sears faced a stagnating market. It needed to
find a way to use its existing tangible and intangible capital to effect a move-
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have come to its new role in a relatively autocratic fashion. This time the future
ofthe company was subject to extensive debate.
One group of managers, within the retailing group and up from the Field,
that is, up from working in and supervising Sears's many stores, believed radi-
cal means were required to execute the Wood's traditional strategy. There were
too many private deals between the buyers and the store managers. There were
excessively broad selections of goods on display and in inventory. Store man-
agers faced excessive temptations to advertise and have sales to keep revenues
up and to get goods they had purchased out the door. This party wanted to
revitalize Sears retailing by shaking up the organization: they wanted to change
who made decisions. This was a retailing alternative, though a disturbing one
to the traditional culture ofthe Field.
Indeed, this party discovered, as it explored its intuitions, that it was hard to
tell from the Sears control system just how well or badly the Field and the
catalogue were doing. For it emerged that Wood and his successors had not
even adequately differentiated the stores and the catalogue operations. Goods
ordered and purchased by Sears's buyers went into a common pool from which
they were sold through both outlets. How could Sears corporate decision mak-
ers know which outlets were profitable? How could they tell about the cata-
logue? And how could demand in an outlet or in a location be communicated
back to a buyer? And ifit were communicated, how could the buyer's actions
be evaluated? The cost of information processing may have necessitated this
aggregative view in the 1920s. But a lot had changed in the ensuing fifty years.
New modes ofknowing were now possible, and they revealed, this group felt,
a need for dramatic changes both in what was done and in how the decisions
ofwhat to do should be made.
The overall thrust ofthis group's proposals was back-to-basics. "[The] over-
all strategies we recommend for these next five years are embarrassingly
fundamental no revolutionary insights, no earthshaking revelations," wrote
the head of the buyers in a key internal document (Sears, Roebuck and Co.
1978). "They are as basic as blocking and tackling." The strategies included
superficially novel departures from past practice such as limited selling of
nationally branded products, but the focus was on centralized control of the
breadth of product lines (variety within categories was to shrink radically to
five or even three) and of other aspects ofoperations-to a substantial extent
even advertising and pricing-that had since the 1920s been left to the Field
organization and store managers. This seems to have been a conscious rejec-
tion ofWood's emphasis on democracy in the organization. This group hear-
kened instead back to an earlier phase in Sears's history where centralization
achieved economies ofscale in selling to a national market and everything else
adapted to the centrally made decisions. The executive appointed to head the
retailing group shortly thereafter told reporters in 1981 that he felt very
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store. Ifthere were a right way to do something, then that right way should be
used in New York, Los Angeles, and Miami.
Another group, this one in the corporate office, saw the solution to the prob-
lem ofSears's earnings differently. This group's adherents appear to have taken
the overstoring notion very seriously indeed. But they do not seem to have
seriously envisioned any fundamental change in the autonomy of the store
managers within their four walls and in their local market. They proposed to
drop nothing. Instead, they wanted to fit new services into Wood's stores.
This was an essentially conservative group, identified with the Field rather
than with headquarters. It wanted to preserve the Field's independence through
decentralized responsibility. That was, the view ran, the heart ofwhat it was to
be a Sears store manager. They also had no desire to abandon the four-walls
approach that gave that decentralized responsibility effective influence: the
mosaic of stores all across the country, carefully sited to be in optimum loca-
tions in individual neighborhoods and carefully spaced so as not to intrude
upon one another's market areas was not the problem either. Nor did this group
feel that the problem lay in the time-hallowed selection of product categories
Sears presented to the public. The problem was just that the presentation was
tired. Sears needed to jazz things up. New fixturing was in order. Popular cul-
ture figures like CherylTeigs should be recruited to lend their names to private-
label product lines. The catalogue covers should evoke a slightly hipper life.
The concept of Sears stores and their operations would be essentially un-
changed. Demand would be stimulated with advertising and brand names. And
people would be attracted to Sears by the addition of new businesses. These
executives sought to find new businesses that would appeal to the customer
they understood, the customer who valued the Sears that had been. They
thought in terms ofbuying existing companies rather than, in the spirit ofGen-
eral Wood, developing their own new lines of business. Since the executives
wanted to improve nationwide performance, they needed companies whose
operations were also large and so, almost by construction, national in scope.
They looked at companies in whose businesses trust was an important compo-
nent, to complement the powerful positive reputation all polls showed Sears
itselfhad with the American consuming public.9
They conducted market research. They had been in the credit-card business
for two decades, principally to support their own sales, and were surprised to
discover that their customers were undersupplied with financial services.
Nearly 70 percent of Sears card holders with income greater than $36,000 a
year (over $60,000 in 1996 terms) had no brokerage account. Fifty-seven per-
cent ofAmerican households held Sears cards, more than any other. Forhouse-
holds all across the income distribution, financial services were purchased
from a wide variety ofvendors. Surveys turned up evidence of some desire to
consolidate these relationships.
9. One can trace the contours ofthis search in the files ofPhilip Purcell in the Sears Archive.237 Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century
Developments in the external environment around this time made financial
services operations attractive. Demand was visibly incr~asing. While the rate
offamily formation was down, existing families were aging. Having furnished
their houses, they were beginning to save for their children's education and
their own retirement. Sears could follow them through this life cycle. The cus-
tomers could stay with Sears.
Inflation in the late 1970s had been in double digits, and investors were
becoming both more sensitive to yields and more sophisticated. Entry was be-
coming easier. Because oftechnical legal details, Sears could enter this busi-
ness unburdened by many ofthe regulations that would constrain competitors.
Ifit could tum long-term (or even long-past and trusting) Sears appliance and
insurance customers into financial-services customers, there was hope of
avoiding the intense direct competition then going on between the Wall Street
firms. Perhaps economies could also be reaped in distribution and selling costs
through using the Sears national network ofstores. Finally, the huge and rela-
tively stable Sears cash flow provided a substantial resource in facing the in-
vestment risk. And parts ofthe business were even familiar. The Sears organi-
zation itselfhad immense cash flows to manage, and it did so successfully. By
the early 1980s, when all this came to a head, Sears had run credit cards for
thirty years. It had sold insurance for fifty. Allstate had dabbled in other finan-
cial products. All these ventures had basically been successful.
What would expanding into the financial services sector in a serious way do
for the historic Sears operations (as opposed to the Sears income statement)?
A significant amount of the investment in store sites and in advertising and
public relations designed to generate store traffic was sunk. The Sears manage-
ment hoped to build on this base. Sears customers were in the stores and in a
buying mood. They could be induced, the managers thought, to buy financial
services as well as durable goods. The consumer, in short, would benefit from
one-stop shopping across an even wider range ofgoods and services than any-
one previously had offered. The value of the fixed costs of running the store
and ofthe real estate would rise.
The corporate managers at Sears clearly thought there was synergy between
such new activities and the old activities .of the firm. Philip Purcell, head of
Sears's strategic planning group, said at the time that "[t]here is no reason why
someone shouldn't go into a Sears store and buy a shirt and coat, and then
maybe some stock. I don't consider that any more outrageous than the first idea
like that that came up, that someone might buy a coat and tie, then buy auto
insurance" (Weiner 1980).
The reasoning behind such a view is curious. The idea that people in the
1930s came in to Sears to buy clothes and then happened to buy insurance is
far from Wood's conceptualization of his stores. Wood thought that people
would come to buy tires and get their car repaired-and then also buy auto
insurance. The intimate connection between specific products and services had
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The parallel between auto insurance and, for example, stock purchases also
misses important aspects of the services in question. Auto insurance is like a
warranty on a product. It protects the purchaser ofa car and ofcarparts against
problems that may come in the future from the car. Itis like a guarantee against
defects in an appliance. But most financial-services products have none of
these qualities. Instead of protecting purchasers, the products expose them to
risk. There is no sense in which the consumer was to be protected or insured
from a poor choice ofstocks. The law oflarge numbers was not on the custom-
ers' side in financial services.
The imprecision ofthis parallel suggests strongly that the anticipated syner-
gies between Sears and a financial-services firm would not come about. How-
ever profitable such an acquisition might be as a portfolio investment, it would
not have a revitalizing effect on Sears retailing operations.
The conservative option, championed by the corporate leadership and the
Field, carried the day. Resources were invested in store renovation. Images of
Cheryl Teigs went into the stores and the catalogue. Merchandising was also
simplified and decision making became somewhat more centralized. To this
extent, the first group got its way. But these were small things. There was no
large-scale reconfiguration oforganization and infrastructure. In the traditional
lines ofbusiness, the locus ofcontrol shifted a little. Butin terms ofinfrastruc-
ture, it was more business as usual than not. On the other hand, the company
began an extended process of considering financial-services acquisition tar-
gets. Two leads were pursued to fruition. First, Sears bought the real-estate
brokerage Coldwell Banker. Shortly thereafter, it bought the securities broker-
age house ofDean Witter. 10
This managerial decision was not inevitable. The first group described above
could have been given its head. There were other, even more radical alterna-
tives for Sears. Before discussing the actual subsequent history ofSears in the
1980s, we want to flesh out a counterfactual Sears. It is hard to know how a
large organization like Sears would have looked in this alternate world; we
know from the history ofthe 1920s that change did not come easily to its far-
flung operations. Nevertheless, two models of merchandising were emerging
at the time of this decision about the future of Sears. Each connects with the
reasons the move into retailing earlier in the century had been successful. Ei-
ther or both of them could have been the result of the first alternative, if that
path had been chosen.
The avatar ofthe first model is Wal-Mart. This company generated tremen-
dous profits in the 1980s through a commercial strategy that focused on keep-
ing in touch with its workaday customers and keeping costs low. The most
obvious foundation ofits success was locational, but the means through which
location was exploited is the theme we want to pursue. The parallels with
Sears's strategy in the 1920s are striking.
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Wal-Mart set up stores in towns its competitors reckoned to be too small to
support a general-merchandise store. This was Montgomery Ward's policy of
the 1920s in a new and more appropriate context. Wal-Mart was able to make
a success of operating in these locations because its costs were significantly
lower than those ofits competitors. Some ofthe reasons this was so were site-
specific. Ground rents were lower. Staff compensation expenses tended to be
relatively low because the stores were in places in which the opportunity cost
of labor was relatively low. Advertising expenses were relatively low in part
because rates in county papers tend to be lower than in big-city dailies and in
part because the largest retailer in a district, particularly ifit follows an every-
day low pricing strategy, does not need to inform its potential customers about
its existence and price levels as much as it would ifit had real competitors and
price competition through sales.
These savings are all in the cost category ofselling, general, and administra-
tive expenses, an important category but one much smaller than the cost of
goods sold. Wal-Mart acquired goods cheaply. It got them to the stores cheaply.
It used the shelf space extremely productively. These practices were the real
foundation of its overall low costs. The low costs supported stores in smaller
markets, and the markets were to a substantial extent expanded beyond what
potential competitors might have thought possible by passing on some of the
lower costs in lower prices.
Wal-Mart acquired goods cheaply the way Sears had traditionally operated:
it offered economies ofscale to suppliers while making sure whenever it could
that the suppliers were more dependent on Wal-Mart than Wal-Mart was on
them. The scale economies derived from the fact that Wal-Mart placed orders
centrally, that is, on behalf of the entire company rather than on a store-by-
store basis. Since Wal-Mart ran a high turnover business, these orders were
large. Wal-Mart took care to use multiple sources whenever the good was not
branded. This limited the bargaining power of suppliers. Wherever possible,
Wal-Mart arranged that its orders were very important to each of its partial
suppliers. Sometimes it accomplished this end simply by being a very large (if
not the dominant) customer. Sometimes it did this by encouraging the supplier
to make sunk investments in the relationship, thus creating barriers to exitfrom
it. Wal-Mart's policy echoed Sears's policy in its incomplete but still powerful
vertical integration with its suppliers.
Wal-Mart also had several strategies that were novel to the industry for get-
ting goods to the stores cheaply. The first ofthese concerned its use ofdistri-
bution centers. Rather than have vendors ship goods directly to store doors,
Wal-Mart had 80 percent of the goods channeled through a small number of
Wal-Mart distribution centers. In these, the truckloads ofshipments from indi-
vidual vendors were broken down and combined into full-truck shipments for
particular (clusters of) Wal-Mart stores. (Since Wal-Mart stores were com-
monly relatively close to one another, it was often efficient to supply several at
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in such a truckload were often small, resupply had to be frequent. But since
the trucks were running full and the stores were clustered, this did notrepresent
a serious inefficiency.
The second supply strategy supported the first. Wal-Mart encouraged na-
tional vendors and vendors from other regions ofthe country to set up produc-
tion facilities in the regions in which the Wal-Mart stores were. That way, the
trucks could fill up with goods bound for the distribution centers once they had
disgorged their cargo. This strategy was obviously limited by the extent to
which the vendors' production processes had economies ofscale beyond Wal-
Mart's needs. But Wal-Mart trucks typically ran back 60 percent full, so the
limitations cannot have been extreme.
The third important aspect ofhow Wal-Mart was able to operate profitably
in these previously infeasibly small markets strikes our theme of keeping in
touch with customers: it kept revenues high and unit costs low by using its
shelfspace efficiently_ Very early on, Wal-Mart began investing in data-capture
and transmission technology that enabled it to track the precise details ofwhat
was selling where. Its product line was focused, generally speaking, on un-
flashy categories for which there was steady demand. Nonetheless, tastes did
vary across space and time. Getting the maximal value out of the available
shelf space, both in terms ofthe speed with which products put out would be
sold and in terms of the prices they would command, turned on monitoring
what was in demand at each location and making sure some was available
when customers sought it out. Instead of relying on high-variable-cost and
low-reliability staffinventories (that is, physical counts, inevitably taken only
at intervals), Wal-Mart monitored the incoming shipments and the outgoing
sales through scanners at the registers and could for practical purposes do this
continuously. The company kept detailed statistics on which products and
brands (even in which aisle locations) generated maximum profits per square
foot of shelf space. It exploited the frequency ofshipments to avoid stockouts
without having to keep large in-store stocks. And it minimized in-store storage
facilities in order to maximize productive selling space. The warehouses, after
all, were in even lower-rent districts.
Wal-Mart pursued lines familiar to Sears. But it pursued them in a stream-
lined way based on investment in new information technology. Sears was op-
erating with an older version of this technology in which only highly aggre-
gated information reached management. Sears's practices kept its costs high,
its ordering cycle long, and its stores operating separately rather than as a unit.
For Sears to have competed directly with Wal-Mart, it would have had to re-
thinkfrom the ground up how goods passed from manufacturers to consumers.
Sears managers told themselves that Wal-Mart and other low-price firms suc-
ceeded because they sold cheap goods, representing a move down-market that
Sears would not follow. The focus on the goods sold obscured the innovations
in the way Wal-Mart and other firms organized like it handled the products.
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Wal-Mart pursued this approach selling goods for which there was a reason-
ably steady and predictable overall demand. A different approach to keeping
costs low and keeping in touch with the customers suggests itself for goods
with a more substantial fashion content, that is, goods for which demand is not
reasonably steady and predictable but is, rather, quite volatile over time.
This second approach may be identified with the practices of companies
such as The Gap and The Limited, both enterprises that for practical purposes
started after scanner technology was developed and computing power became
cheap. The approach they used also relies importantly on rapid and inexpen-
sive capture ofsales data.
In traditionally organized department-store retailing, merchandising deci-
sions were made by buyers who supervised both the selling and the procure-
ment function. The advantage ofthis bundling was that these individuals could
oversee the customers making up their minds and could therefore gather infor-
mation not only on what actually was selling but also about what would have
sold if only it were in stock. The disadvantage of this arrangement was the
limited nature ofthe scale economies it afforded. No matter how good the taste
ofindividual buyers or how thorough their knowledge might have been ofone
store's clientele, they could under this traditional system only buy for the de-
partment and the clientele they could see. For many scores ofyears, there was
one buyer for each department for each store, even after the growth ofchains
of department stores. Even until quite recently, aggregation was confined to
narrowly defined regions.
A further consequence ofthis system was that the orders booked with indi-
vidual vendors tended to be small even when the aggregate orders coming from
the company that owned the store were large. Individual buyers therefore did
not have much bargaining power with the vendors. It was difficult for the ven-
dors to minimize setup costs ofmachinery, dyeing equipment, and even cloth
procurement under such circumstances. Needless to say, the vendors would
have preferred to have these economies (if for no other reason than for the
reduction in complexity oftheir own operations). To some extent they insisted
on being paid for the inefficiencies, in effect ignoring the fact that orders from
Macy's New Haven and Macy's 34th Street were both orders from R. H. Macy
and Company. To some extent they maneuvered around the inefficiencies by
insisting on long delivery lags. Under this system, Macy's had to commit to
cuts and colors five to nine months before the goods reached the shelves. This
was obviously a disadvantage in selling fashionable goods. Mistakes were in-
evitable and expensive-either heavy discounts or expensive staff time and
resources were required to get the unwanted goods out ofthe way and replaced
by goods with better prospects.
A system in which orders were placed on the basis of much more current
information and then delivered promptly would have been better. There would
have been fewer fashion mistakes and less expense in rectifying them. Such a
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cause production runs were longer. Regional and even national orders from
chains, that is, from integrated buying, would call for these longer runs. Com-
panies like The Gap and The Limited delivered precisely such orders. There
were some savings from requiring fewer buyers. (These were offset only alittle
by needing to pay these individuals more. The old system had required very
many buyers.) There were some savings from tying up working capital for
shorter periods and some-though less than one might have expected-from
economies ofscale in production. But the buying companies using this system
did not want to claw back all the cost reductions their larger orders were yield-
ing the vendors. Time, in the twin guises of savings on reduced markdowns
and increases in sustainable initial markups, was far more valuable. These im-
provements were made possible during the 1980s by the growth ofinformation
technology, in which computers were used to record sales as they occurred,
integrate and analyze the resulting data, and communicate the results directly
to producers (Abernathy et al. 1995).
Raff and Salmon (1992) contains provisional estimates ofhow much of an
advantage this system offered circa 1988 (around the time ofa famous lever-
aged buyout that correctly identified the consequences ofthe inefficiencies of
traditional department store practice but wildly overestimated how substantial
the improvements might be). The estimates prove to be quite substantial. The
final yardstick concerns the difference between the two types of stores in op-
erating income as a percentage ofsales in a key apparel category. The system's
advantages come to 55-60 percent of the difference. The individuals behind
the two companies in question became billionaires during the decade in which
their companies introduced this system and the traditional department stores
did not adapt. These billions were, like those of the founder ofWal-Mart, the
fruit ofkeeping in touch with what consumers wanted to buy and ofkeeping
costs low in ways competitors found difficult to replicate.
These savings depended on having accurate and current information. The
means by which the most accurate and most current information could be ob-
tained were changing rapidly in the 1980s, and the standards of accuracy and
currency were rising fast. Sears would have had to be on top ofthe new infor-
mation technology to transform itself into a chain like Wal-Mart or The Gap.
To do so would have been harder than itwas for these new competitors because
Sears had disadvantages growing out of its prior success. Its very size was in
some respects an impediment. It needed an information system that would be
able to handle national-scale transactions and inventory tracking for the very
large product line that Sears offered. It even needed, on a more mundane level,
some way to track its catalogue and retail operations separately. They were all
in the same rich soup around 1980, and it was impossible for Sears's manage-
ment to tell which orders had done well and where the purchase variances were
relative to plan. Although Sears's great size made the problem hard, it also
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to have been able to hire the best people and to stay at the forefront of the
new possibilities.
The profits of Sears's competitors were partly the result of opening free-
standing specialty stores. Customers knew exactly what was contained in these
stores, and they entered them to buy specific goods. The Sears concept offour
walls, by contrast, was a vision of one-stop shopping. People in this view
thought hard about a shopping trip and then bundled the whole family into the
car for a trip to Sears. It was far from The Gap's and The Limited's notion that
a shopper would make a trip justfor a sweater or a bra. For Sears to follow the
lead of these specialty stores, it would have had to do more than update its
computers. It also would have had to breach the four walls of the Sears store
and establish independent specialty outlets between the large stores.
What is the relationship between these two examples? The Gap and The
Limited sold goods where fresh information was absolutely critical to success
because goods that did not sell soon would never sell at first price. The cost of
fashion mistakes was high. Wal-Mart sold goods that would always sell even-
tually, but it too wanted to stay in stock with goods that were selling now.
In apparently very different categories, the efficient use of shelf space was a
prime cause ofthe competitive success ofboth. Sears, diverse as it was, might
have had something to learn.
These firms provide models ofradical innovations available to Sears. We do
not mean to argue that Sears should have blindly imitated all details ofopera-
tions ofWal-Mart or The Gap. Instead we maintain that innovations like those
ofthe firms we have just discussed were becoming the competitive standard in
all categories in which any firm adopted them. We therefore believe that such
innovations represented a more appropriate program for Sears than the acquisi-
tions being contemplated unless Sears intended to abandon the categories in
question entirely. IfSears had been able to adopt some ofthe new technology
that enabled more rapid capture and exploitation ofinformation, it might have
kept up with the rapidly changing market. If Sears had rethought its internal
operations and taken advantage of some of the progress of technology since
Rosenwald's distribution plant was built, it might have been able to maintain
its traditional economies ofoperation into new decades.
This is not a wildly speculative alternative. It was rumored in this period
that Sears was contemplating opening chains offree-standing auto equipment
stores, chains of hardware stores, chains of children's clothing stores. These
are all categories in which Sears products had good reputations and substantial
market share. They are all categories in which other entrepreneurs set up in the
course of the 1980s in the style we have described and operated extremely
profitably. The most famous such success took place in retail terrain as appar-
ently unattractive as the usually highly seasonal category of toys. But even
there, entrepreneurs with the new information technology in hand succeeded
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mendous selections within the narrow categories profitable. Ifit could happen
there, where might it not? Sears had a business it valued in each ofthe catego-
ries listed above. But it proceeded in the new aggressive ways in none ofthem.
The very idea seems to have been thought too organizationally disruptive.
Why were the stores so sacrosanct? Perhaps these people feared cannibaliza-
tion ofthe vast network of stores already in place. Perhaps they feared that it
would be impossible to evaluate the success of any of the parts in a mixed
system. Perhaps it was all cultural: perhaps they felt that too much ofthe com-
pany's working management had come up through the old decentralized sys-
tem, could not imagine life at Sears without it, and would simply quit, leaving
Sears in the lurch, iftoo much changed.
The resistance to free-standing single-category stores was an even more pro-
found constraint than it appeared. It was clearly feasible to implement the in-
formation technology required to run such category-killer-like operations on a
free-standing basis: this was the foundation-"the stick that stirred the drink,"
to borrow a phrase from the sports pages-ofthe bl9ssoming ofthe category
killers themselves. But modifying the vast corporate software that coordinated
and controlled all the multifarious lines of Sears was a task of immensely
greater proportions and impediment, and was clearly not feasible at the time. 11
The four walls were not just ramparts. They were tremendous barriers to
progress.
Sears held onto Coldwell Banker and Dean Witter for a decade. The finan-
cial results were basically strong. (Indeed, in some years, they were the bul-
wark supporting a generally anemic performance of the merchandising and
sales operation.) The operations ofthese two divisions even compared well to
the results of comparable firms in their own industries. But these operations'
successes did not show the synergies that had been foreseen. The financial
companies found that locating offices in Sears stores offered no advantages to
them. In fact, outlets at Sears fared worse than independent locations, and
Dean Witter's agents resisted assignment to Sears with all their might (Roge
1988, 250). Sears's customers were not attracted to a single source for con-
sumption and savings vehicles. They seem to have trusted Sears to make wash-
ing machines-which could be returned ifthey did not operate properly-but
not to make investments-which couldn't.
The outcome was actually much worse than a simple lack of development
of the hoped-for synergies. Merchandizing group sales at Sears did not grow
nearly as rapidly in the 1980s as those of Kmart and Wal-Mart. As shown in
table 6.2 Kmart surpassed Sears in in the early 1980s. So did Wal-Mart by the
end of the decade, despite the fact that Wal-Mart had started from a much
smaller base. Despite some relatively good years in the mid-1980s, the profile
of Sears results by the end of the decade was such that the retail operations
actually appeared to be a drag on overall performance. The requirements of
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Table 6.2 Total Revenues ofSears Merchandizing Group and Some
Competitors (millions ofdollars)
Chain 1982 1985 1988 1991
Sears 18,779 22,092 24,252 24,757
Kmart 16,772 22,420 27,301 34,580
1. C. Penney 11,414 13,747 14,833 16,201
Wal-Mart 3,376 8,452 20,649 43,886
Source: Annual reports.
competitiveness were evolving. Large volume was not sufficient in itselffor a
firm to keep up. Sears was not making the complementary investments. The
asset value ofthe Sears name was wasting.
Shareholder activists, and others, noticed this. They thought they could
make their portfolio investment decisions for themselves, and that the job of
Sears management was to nurture and exploit the Sears retailing franchise.
They were therefore opposed to improving the stock returns by divesting retail.
The Sears retailing operations, they thought, were still a potentially valuable
asset. Instead, they demanded improvement in the retailing performance. Mar-
ket share had been eroding. Entry-driven increased competition was clearly a
part of this, but it was suspected that intractable bureaucracy and an out-of-
line cost structure driven in part by a failure to keep up with the infrastructure
investments being made by firms competing for the Sears customers' business
played significant roles as well.
By the early 1990s this process had gone far enough to put Sears onto the
list of potential takeover targets. Senior management took defensive actions.
They also began more structural changes. Among the changes offered was sell-
ing the financial acquisitions and, equally, a stake in Allstate. Now retailing
would have to be fixed or there would be nothing.
By 1996 in-store boutiques were the leading market concept. Sears could
still get good procurement prices: it was the largest single customer of Levi
Strauss. The head ofSears logistics had come to the job straight from the anal-
ogous army staff position in Operation Desert Storm.
12 The changes he over-
saw were dramatic. The number of channels store managers had to order
through shrank by up to two-thirds. Suppliers began to make output more
promptly after receiving orders and shipped more frequently. The goods were
therefore fresher. Sears could also cut its own inventory holdings and thus in-
ventory carrying costs. The capacity utilization ofdelivery trucks that ran from
Sears's distribution centers to the stores rose from 60 percent to 90. The more
frequent deliveries freed up in-store storage space for sales use. Altogether,
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) had fallen by midsum-
merof1996 to 21.6 percent ofsales, more than two points better than the close
12. For these details and more, see Berner 1996.246 Daniel M. G. Raffand PeterTemin
competitorJ. C. Penney and only two points worse than the superbly organized
May Company. And it was not clear that forward progress had stopped.
6.5 Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that Sears, Roebuck and Company faced simi-
lar challenges in the 1920s and 1980s. In both periods, the retail operation was
working well and generating respectable returns. But both times Sears also
faced a stagnating market. In neither decade did the prospect ofcarrying on in
the traditional fashion offer much promise.
In each period, the company set offon something new. In the earlier period,
Sears added retail stores to its mail-order operations. In the later period, Sears
added financial services to its retail stores. Retail stores proved to be wildly
successful; financial services ultimately a distraction. Why?
We opened this discussion by asserting that successful responses to situa-
tions like these focus on an attractive market that can be supplied exploiting a
firm's existing competitive strengths. Retail stores in the 1920s embodied this
combination. The attractiveness of the market was the result of demographic
changes and a new technology. The automobile and its related activities created
new jobs for Sears's customers and new opportunities for them to spend their
earnings. Retail stores enabled these customers to continue to patronize Sears
with the aid ofthe new technology.
Information technology was to the 1980s as the automobile was to the
1920s. Itprovided a new way for consumers to interact with retailers. Butwhile
the change in the 1920s was due to the consumers' use ofthe auto, the change
in the 1980s was due to the stores' use ofinformation technology. Cars brought
consumers to the stores that had a wide range ofproducts; computers enabled
stores to bring to consumers the selection of products that consumers de-
manded. We have described in each case how the new technology was used by
some merchants to attract a profitable and defendable base to their stores.
But it was not used to this effect in Sears's stores in the 1980s. Where Wood
had really shaken up the organization, the new changes shook up people in the
organization without really shaking up the organization at all. Sears in effect
opted to ignore investment possibilities in retailing that would have had a pow-
erful positive effect on its future viability and instead concentrated its entrepre-
neurial energies on expanding into financial services instead. Why did they
think this was a good choice, and why was it not?
Financial services were presented as a way to utilize the presence of the
customer in a Sears store. Instead oftailoring the,merchandise to the custom-
ers' demands-as the new information technology allowed-Sears placed its
bets on deciding what the consumers wanted. Instead ofaltering the merchan-
dising of goods, merchandising was carried on roughly as it had been and fi-
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tween financial and retail services did not materialize. The presumption that
people would make yet another majorpurchase on their trips to Sears was erro-
neous.
Sears was able to disentangle itself from its new operations as easily as it
began them. While there is no doubt that financial services were a profitable
market, Sears had no special advantage in that market.
While this seems obvious in hindsight, it must not have been so obvious at
the time. Sears debated its strategy in 1980 as it faced the dilemma ofa stagnat-
ing market. Ifindividuals reasoned exactly along the lines ofthis paper, their
thoughts seem to have gotten no farther than the rumor stage. The group that
reasoned most closely to the analysis of this paper lost out to the group that
led Sears into finance. Management very nearly lost control ofthe company in
consequence. Facing vigorous new entrants once the company refocused on
retailing, the task of regaining place and momentum was only harder. That it
proved possible to regain some place and momentum is a credit to manage-
ment. But it is no measure ofthe forgone profits.
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Comment Thomas J. Misa
Daniel Raff and Peter Temin revisit the story ofSears, Roebuck in the twenti-
eth century to advance an analytical agenda ofexploring certain neglected as-
pects of the interaction of economics and history. Their paper analyzes deci-
sion making at Sears during two critical periods in the company's history: in
the 1920s and in the 1980s. Their analysis focuses on changes in technology,
markets, entrepreneurship, and information flows. They repeat the well-known
finding that Sears successfully met the challenge in the 1920s of expanding
urban markets and increasingly mobile consumers by opening retail stores ad-
vantageously placed in the outlying districts of urban areas. Sears customers
not only drove their automobiles to the stores but also bought automobile parts,
automobile tires, and automobile insurance there. In company with other writ-
ers, they are impressed with Robert Wood's prescient vision for the company
as well as the way that his decentralized policies optimized information
flows-for instance by decentralizing decision making about stocking individ-
ual stores while aggregating the resulting orders to gain economies of scale
from suppliers.
Given hindsight, Raff and Temin are deeply critical of the decisions made
in the 1980s. While Sears in the 1920s captured competitive advantages by
understanding the opportunities presented by the interaction ofchanging mar-
kets and new technology, in the form ofurban consumers driving automobiles,
the company in the 1980s apparently did not appreciate that the emerging in-
Thomas J. Misa is associate professor of history at the Illinois Institute of Technology. His
book, A Nation ofSteel: The Making ofModern America, 1865-1925 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), received the 1997 Dexter Prize given by the Society for the History of
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formation technology presented opportunities for retailers to coordinate pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption and that demographic and economic
changes were undermining the purchasing power of its customer base of
young, blue-collar families. These market- and technology-driven opportuni-
ties were captured more fully by Wal-Mart and specialized retailers like The
Gap. After lengthy debate, and absent a strong entrepreneurial vision like
Wood's, Sears diversified into financial services. While earlier writers, includ-
ing Worthy (1986, 260-69), extolled the logic of these purchases and confi-
dently predicted that the company would go from success to success, Raffand
Temin have the benefit of more-recent hindsight. It turns out that not enough
Sears customers, however underprovided they were with financial services,
wanted to go to Sears and-at one stop-choose a washing machine, buy a
house (from Coldwell Banker) to put it in, and invest in securities (from Dean
Witter) with the leftover money. There are a number ofpuzzling questions that
follow from the statement of Philip Purcell, head of Sears's planning group,
"there is no reason why someone shouldn't go into a Sears store and buy a shirt
and coat, and then maybe some stock." Would customers choose the securities
oftheir shirt company? Does one choose government bonds and a white refrig-
erator to accompany a Federal-style house? Apparently Sears top management
thought thatfamily decisions about consumption are taken at the same moment
as family decisions about investment. Raffand Temin hint that the centralizing
tendencies of the executives backing diversification made the company even
less nimble, less consumer-sensitive, and hence less competitive in present-
day fluid, segmented markets. After reviewing the alternative technology and
business strategies ofThe Gap, The Limited, and Wal-Mart, the authors con-
clude that these firms' innovations in capturing sales data and using them to
guide shelf stocking and coordinate purchasing "were becoming the competi-
tive standard in all categories in which any firm adopted them."
At least three dimensions of the Sears story merit greater attention for the
themes ofthis paper: advertising, scale, and gender. Advertising appears prom-
inently only in the prehistory to the 1920s, in the form of the famous Sears
catalogue; it appears obliquely in the briefcomments that Wal-Mart found ad-
vertising rates to be lower in small-town papers compared with big-city dailies
and that Sears placed images ofCheryl Teigs in the stores and catalogue. Oth-
erwise, it appears that Sears in the 1920s and 1980s engaged in little or no
advertising to speakof. A company's advertising is one easily located historical
source, which often speaks volumes about who the prospective consumers are,
or who the company hopes them to be. After all, it was just in the 1920s that
advertising itselfbecomes an industry. Indeed, Sears's history seems to be one
long "fable ofabundance" (Lears 1994). Greater attention to Sears advertising
would not only flesh out the company's views ofits customers, but would also
link this present paper to other historians' efforts to examine the cultural pro-
ductions ofAmerican business.
Second, there is the question ofscale and the dynamics ofdecision making.250 Daniel M. G. Raffand PeterTemin
While I appreciate the point that decision making by committee is not inher-
ently superior to decision making by executive fiat, there is some unfairness in
assuming that Sears in the 1980s could have been reformed ifonly an entrepre-
neurial figure like Wood in his prime had been at the helm. 1 In the 1980s Sears,
as the authors recount, was a vast enterprise. Unlike the 1920s its employees
through stock ownership held the largest single share ofthe company. On the
notion that stakeholders (not only stockholders) in a company ought to have
some say in how the enterprise is managed, I am not persuaded that autocratic
decision making is desirable. Another intriguing point briefly touched upon in
the paper is the outstanding quality ofGeneral Wood's lieutenants. In the steel
industry such "heroic" entrepreneurs as Andrew Carnegie and Charles Schwab
were remarkably well served by loyallieutenants.2 Not only are such lieuten-
ants the proximate source ofinformation, ideas, and alternatives; they also may
constructively dissent from the top executive's initial judgment. The necessity
ofgoing Inside the Business Enterprise (Temin 1991) to uncover the dynamics
ofsuch decision making remains an important insight. In this regard, I wanted
more information on the "extensive debate" within Sears during the early
1980s and more analysis ofit. Both groups ofmanagers offering rival strategic
plans for the company (should they be labeled the retail-reformers and the
corporate-diversifiers?) had a strong identification with "the Field," that is, the
store-level managers. There were a great many managers with field experience,
and any retailing strategy required their active assistance and enthusiasm. In-
deed, reconceptualizing business "strategy" as an emergent and negotiated
phenomenon-relaxing the rigid notion of strategy being solely a top-down
creation-helps comprehend the puzzle of why "the store" was so sacrosanct
(at Ward in the 1920s and at Sears in the 1980s).
Third, the analytical category of gender is hinted at in this paper and, to
understand the success ofthe retailing concept in the 1920s, it seems a useful
category to pursue. In contrast to the full line of"hard" and "soft" goods pre-
sented in the Sears catalogue, from underwear to farm machinery, Raff and
Temin indicate that the early retail stores focused on so-called hard goods
(hardware, furnishings, farm implements, plumbing). "They were men's stores
far more than women's," they write. Yet fieldwork at our local Sears store, lo-
cated in an once-outlying area ofurban Chicago, as well as inspection of my
family's credit-card statements, confirms that consumption today is largely in
the hands ofwomen. I imagine that behind such a genderreversal-something
1. Wood continued past his prime, resigning the board chairmanship ofSears in 1954 at the age
ofseventy-five; meanwhile, in the mid-1950s, Ward was cripp.!ed by the incoherent leadership of
Sewell Avery. See the unflattering anecdotes recounted about both men in Tedlow (1990, 330-37).
2. It can be fairly argued that Andrew Carnegie, absent the loyal opposition ofCharles Schwab
and persistent advocacy ofoutsider Henry Oliver in 1897, would not have bought the Minnesota
ore lands that made Carnegie Steel into a vertically integrated company. Similarly, Schwab as
owner of Bethlehem Steel, absent a crucial intervention by Archibald Johnston in 1907, would
have stopped the firm's entry into manufacturing special heavy-duty structural steel beams, a mar-
ket that Bethlehem dominated to great profit for decades. See Misa (1995).251 Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century
like the transformation of the Marlboro brand from a woman's product to a
man's-must be an intriguing story ofmarkets, advertising, and the gendered
construction ofconsumption patterns.
Finally, I would like to take a step back and reflect on the style and focus of
this essay, and on the presumed audience for business and economic history. I
would label Raffand Temitf'S present essay as lessons learned from a manager's
perspective. The managers of Sears, they state, "could not free themselves
from modes of doing business that were tried and true but rapidly becoming
outmoded." The worst prospect in view was that "management very nearly lost
control ofthe company." I think there must be larger questions at play, relating
to the "interaction of economics and history" that the authors hint at in their
introduction. Given the present diversity of approaches in business and eco-
nomic history (a short list must include Chandlerian, institutional, evolution-
ary, and cultural approaches),3 this essay needs more explicitly to justify its
approach and to relate its approach to these others. I would also welcome a
further elaboration on the large and interesting questions relating to the interac-
tion ofeconomics and history. By positing that long-range profitability results
when firms develop competitively valuable asymmetries that frustrate the fa-
miliar forces ofcompetition and free entry, and showing how a large firm can
survive while making below-average returns on investment, they appear to
wipe out one classic rationale for capitalism. From apublic-policy perspective,
the phenomenon of"wasting assets" seems to be a justification for regulatory
intervention.
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